Phantom Torts and Forum Non Conveniens Blocking Statutes: Irony and Metonym in Nicaraguan Special Law 364 by Todd, Jeff
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
2-1-2012
Phantom Torts and Forum Non Conveniens
Blocking Statutes: Irony and Metonym in
Nicaraguan Special Law 364
Jeff Todd
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeff Todd, Phantom Torts and Forum Non Conveniens Blocking Statutes: Irony and Metonym in Nicaraguan Special Law 364, 43 U. Miami




Phantom Torts and Forum Non Conveniens
Blocking Statutes: Irony and Metonym in
Nicaraguan Special Law 364
Jeff Todd*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 292
II. A PRIMER ON THE FOUR MASTER TROPES ............. .. 295
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS DISMISSALS OF DBCP
CASES BROUGHT BY FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS ............. 297
A. DBCP Application, Male Sterility, and the
Banana Industry in Nicaragua ................ 297
B. DBCP Lawsuits Dismissed Under Forum Non
Conveniens Doctrine .... .................... 298
IV. PERCEIVED SHORTCOMINGS OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENs DISMISSALS IN DBCP CASES ............ 301
A. Arguments in Favor of FNC .................. 301
B. Criticisms of FNC .......................... 302
1. Courts Misapplied the Forum Non
Conveniens Test ........................ 302
2. Forum Non Conveniens Is Not Fair to
Foreign Plaintiffs ........................ 304
V. LATIN AMERICA RESPONDS WITH BLOCKING
STATUTES-A METONYMIC REDUCTION ............... 305
A. Alternatives to U.S. Trial .. .................. 306
B. Latin American Blocking Statutes In General.... 307
C. Nicaragua Special Law 364 .................. 308
D. Commentators' Responses to Special Law 364 .... 310
VI. THE REVERSAL: SPECIAL LAW 364 As
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPETUS FOR FRAUD ............ 311
A. Mejia v. Dole Food Co.: Original Action in U.S.
Dismissed as Fraud on the Court.............. 312
* Jeff Todd is an Assistant Professor of Law at Florida Coastal School of Law
(B.A., M.A. University of South Alabama; Ph.D. Texas A&M University; J.D.
University of Texas). While an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, he
represented Dole Food Company, Inc. in several DBCP lawsuits. The ideas and
opinions in this article are exclusively those of the author and have not been reviewed
by Gibson Dunn or Dole.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2
B. Osorio v. Dole Food Co.: Enforcement of
Underlying Nicaraguan Judgment Denied ....... 317
C. (No) Future for Nicaraguan DBCP Claims ....... 321
VII. IRONY, METONYMY, AND SPECIAL LAW 364 ........... 322
VIII. EPILOGUE ................................. ........... 324
I. INTRODUCTION
Nicaragua enacted Special Law 364 to block the forum non
conveniens ("FNC") dismissals of cases brought in the United
States by Nicaraguan plaintiffs who claimed injuries from the pes-
ticide dibromochloropropane ("DBCP").I Special Law 364 offers
one of two unappealing options to DBCP defendants: either allow
cases to go forward in the U.S. and waive the right to challenge
the forum, or litigate in Nicaragua with plaintiff-friendly procedu-
ral and evidentiary mechanisms, multi-million-dollar bond
requirements, and an irrefutable presumption of causation.'
Though the Nicaraguan Supreme Court affirmed the propriety of
Special Law 364,3 one court in the U.S. called it a "significant
impetus" for fraud while another ruled that it does not comport
with international standards for due process.
In June 2009, the Los Angeles County Superior Court dis-
missed with prejudice two related DBCP actions brought by
eleven persons-two bellwether cases that were among the first of
thousands of claims pending and would help determine settlement
of those claims.' The plaintiffs in Mejia v. Dole Food Co. and
Rivera v. Dole Food Co. (collectively "Mejia") alleged that they
1. See Hal S. Scott, What to Do About Foreign Discriminatory Forum Non
Conveniens Legislation, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. Online 95, 100-102 (2009); Walter W.
Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the
Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non
Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 609, 628, 631 (2008); Dante
Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States and Latin America in
the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 119,
158-59 (2005); Paul Santoyo, Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have
Dealt Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to
Achieving Corporate Accountability, 27 HOUST. J. INT'L LAW 703, 729 (2005);
Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: "Availability" and "Adequacy" of Latin
American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 65,
80-81 (2003-04); Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and
Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 22 (2003-04).
2. E.g., Scott, supra note 1, at 100-02; Heiser, supra note 1, at 633.
3. Dahl, supra note 1, at 57.
4. Judgment Dismissing All Plaintiffs with Prejudice, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No.
BC340049 (L.A. Cnty. Super. Ct. June 26, 2009); Judgment Dismissing All Plaintiffs
with Prejudice, Rivera v. Dole Food Co., No. BC379820 (L.A. Cnty. Super. Ct. June 26,
2009); see Edvard Petterson, Dole Wins Dismissal of Nicaraguan Banana Workers'
292
PHANTOM TORTS
were rendered sterile from applying the pesticide on banana farms
in the 1970s.' However, after a three-day evidentiary hearing,
Judge Victoria G. Chaney found "that there is clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Plaintiffs and their U.S. counsel, Juan J. Domin-
guez, and their Nicaraguan counsel, Antonio Hernandez
Ordefiana . . . have committed fraud on this Court and on the
Defendants."' She found that U.S. and Nicaraguan attorneys
from multiple firms conspired-with each other and with at least
one Nicaraguan judge and several medical laboratories-to
recruit plaintiffs who had never worked on banana farms and who
were not sterile; to falsify work histories, sterility tests, and the
paternity of children born in the 1980s and 1990s; to train plain-
tiffs to lie about farm facts; and to threaten and intimidate wit-
nesses and investigators.' Given the outrageous details of this
fraudulent scheme, one might easily overlook Judge Chaney's
finding on Special Law 364: "The advent of Special Law 364 was a
significant impetus in establishing an industry that developed
around DBCP litigation in Nicaragua for the purpose of bringing
fraudulent claims."8
A few months later, on October 20, 2009, the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida in Osorio v. Dole Food Co.
ordered that a $97 million judgment obtained in Nicaragua "be
neither recognized nor enforced."' Hundreds of persons, again
claiming sterility from exposure to DBCP, had brought the under-
lying action under Special Law 364.10 Judge Paul C. Huck found
that the underlying judgment could not be enforced against
Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=auzqr9rexj5c&refer=us.
5. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Supporting Order Terminating Mejia
and Rivera Cases for Fraud on the Court 1 11, Nos. BC340049 and BC379820 (L.A.
Cnty. Super. Ct. June 17, 2009) (hereinafter "Mejia Findings").
6. Id. 3.
7. Id. 75-85, 103, 113. These findings garnered international media attention.
See, e.g., Steve Stecklow, Fraud by Trial Lawyers Taints Wave of Pesticide Lawsuits,
WALL STREET J., Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB125081383405
01.html; Victoria Kim & Alan Zarembo, Pesticide cases could be upended, L.A. TIMES,
Jul. 12, 2009, http://www.articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/12/locallme-dole12; Petterson,
supra note 4; Gina Keating, Judge Throws Out Dole "Bananeros" Cases, Citing Fraud,
REUTERS UK, Apr. 24, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/04/24/bananas-idUKN
2150339620090424; Linda Deutsch, LA Judge Rules Fraud in Suits Against Dole,
Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8471259.
8. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 73.
9. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2009), affd 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6208
(11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2011).
10. Id. at 1318. The Osorio Order attaches an English translation of Law 364 as
Appendix I, so all quotations in this article are from that translation.
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defendants Dole Food Company, Inc. and The Dow Chemical Com-
pany (hereinafter "Dole" and "Dow") pursuant to Florida's Uni-
form Out-of-country Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
on four separate grounds, three of them related to Special Law
364:
The evidence before the Court is that the judgment in this
case did not arise out of proceedings that comported with
the international concept of due process. It arose out of
proceedings that the Nicaraguan trial court did not have
jurisdiction to conduct. During those proceedings, the court
applied a law that unfairly discriminates against a handful
of foreign defendants with extraordinary procedures and
presumptions found nowhere else in Nicaraguan law."
Judge Huck further denied recognition on the separate ground
that Nicaragua has "a weak and corrupt judiciary, such that Nica-
ragua does not possess a 'system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice."'1 2
One approach to understanding the causes that led to the
enactment of Special Law 364 and the effects as manifested in
these two cases is to apply two of the four master tropes from rhet-
orician Kenneth Burke: metonymy and irony." Under his
approach to irony, we can read the Mejia and Osorio judgments in
terms of each other-and in terms of the scholarship about DBCP
litigation-to produce a dialectic that offers a "perspective of per-
spectives" on Special Law 364: the conditions that led to the enact-
ment of this FNC blocking statute also underlay its ultimate
failure.14 And by applying metonymy, one sees that the need for
justice for those exposed to DBCP was reduced merely to attempts
to defeat FNC. Because of this metonymic reduction, Special Law
364 achieved an ironic effect: rather than force a trial on the mer-
its, it ensured that Nicaraguan plaintiffs would be denied any
meaningful resolution of their claims.
After a brief discussion of Burke's master tropes in Part II,
this article in Part III recounts the history of DBCP litigation, in
particular defendants' successful employment of FNC dismissals.
Part IV summarizes the critical responses both for and against
FNC as applied in DBCP litigation. Part V describes the efforts of
11. Id. at 1351.
12. Id. at 1351-52 (quoting Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
13. See KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 503 (Cal. ed. 1969).
14. Id. at 512.
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various countries to prevent FNC dismissals by enacting blocking
statutes, with a focus on Nicaragua and Special Law 364. Part VI
discusses the findings from Mejia and Osorio on Special Law 364
in more detail to show how Special Law 364 was an impetus for
fraud and why it denies due process. Part VII then offers a meta-
analytical "dialectic" of these two judgments and the relevant
scholarship on DBCP litigation, FNC, and blocking statutes.
II. A PRIMER ON THE FOUR MASTER TROPES
Burke conscripts several concepts from literature, in particu-
lar drama, in crafting his system of rhetoric and rhetorical criti-
cism. One of his approaches involves the four master tropes-
metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, irony-and their "role in the
discovery and description of 'the truth.""' By applying these com-
mon literary tropes as an analytical frame, one gains fresh per-
spectives from which to understand art, history, and, as is
relevant here, law. 16
While this article applies only metonymy and irony, the four
tropes are so intertwined in Burke's system that we must first
touch on metaphor and synecdoche. Metaphor is "perspective," a
"device for seeing something in terms of something else."" While
the scientific approach to achieve objective reality is to winnow
down multiple theories to "the" correct view, the dramatic
approach is that a "variety of perspectives" establishes reality."8
In a sense, the other tropes are "species" of metaphor.'9 Synecdo-
che is "representation," to substitute "part for the whole, whole for
the part, container for the contained, sign for the thing signified,
material for the thing made [ ], cause for effect, effect for cause,
15. Id. at 503. The term "trope" might be best understood by describing its
function in figurative language. All figurative language "is a departure from what
users of the language apprehend as the standard meaning of words, or else the
standard order of words, in order to achieve some special meaning or effect." M.H.
ABRAMS, A GLOSSARY OF LITERARY TERMS 66 (Ted Buchholz ed., 6th ed. 1993).
Figurative language is often subdivided into two categories: figures of speech and
figures of thought, more commonly called tropes. Id. The distinction between the two
involves pattern versus meaning. Figures of speech depart from standard usage "in
the syntactical order or pattern of the words"; common examples include the
rhetorical question, antithesis, and parallelism. Id. at 66; see id. at 183-84. On the
other hand, tropes are "words or phrases . used in a way that effects a conspicuous
change in what we take to be their standard meaning." Id. at 66.
16. See BURKE, supra note 13, at 516.
17. Id. at 503.
18. See id. at 504.
19. ABRAMS, supra note 15, at 68.
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genus for species, species for genus, etc."2 0
Metonymy is "the reduction of some higher or more complex
realm of being to the terms of a lower or less complex realm of
being."2 1 "The basic 'strategy' in metonymy is . . . to convey some
incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangi-
ble."2 2 Metonymy is therefore a "special application" of synecdo-
che. Synecdoche "stresses a relationship or connectedness between
two sides of an equation," such as the movement from quantity to
quality or from quality to quantity.2 3 Metonymy, however, only
allows for reduction: from quality to quantity.24 Literary critic
M.H. Abrams offers several examples that help refine this distinc-
tion between reduction and representation. In synecdoche, "[w]e
use the term 'ten hands' for ten workmen, or 'a hundred sails' (for
ships)." 25 For metonymy, "'the crown' or 'the scepter' can be used
to stand for a king and 'the turf for horse racing.'" 26 The former
examples show connectedness between a tangible object and its
component part: hands are a physical part of men, sails are rigged
to ships. The latter, however, are tangible devices that are merely
associated with intangible concepts. "Turf' is a literal component
of the physical venue for horse racing, which is a sport rather than
an object. And while the person of a "king" may be tangible, the
functions of a king that are associated with his "crown"-govern-
ment, currency, law-are not.
The most common understanding of irony is verbal irony: "a
statement in which the meaning that a speaker implies differs
sharply from the meaning that is ostensibly expressed."27 Burke
takes a broader view by comparing irony to dialectic. "Irony arises
when one tries, by the interaction of terms upon one another, to
produce a development which uses all the terms."28 Burke calls
irony "total form," a "perspective of perspectives": "none of the par-
ticipating 'sub-perspectives' can be treated as either precisely
right or precisely wrong. They are all voices, or personalities, or
positions, integrally affecting one another."29 "Inevitability" is key
to an ironic perspective, which allows one to see how "the develop-
20. BURKE, supra note 13, at 507-08.
21. Id. at 506.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 509 (emphasis original).
24. Id.
25. ABRAMs, supra note 15, at 69 (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 97.




ments that led to the rise will, by the further course of their devel-
opment, 'inevitably' lead to the fall.""o As in classical drama, the
essence of irony is the "'peripety,' the strategic moment of rever-
sal."3 1 Accordingly, Abrams' understanding of irony is akin to dra-
matic irony: "Dramatic irony involves a situation in a play or a
narrative in which the audience or reader shares with the author
knowledge of present or future circumstances of which a character
is ignorant; in that situation, the character unknowingly acts in a
way we recognize to be grossly inappropriate to the actual circum-
stances. ... "32 The difference is that Burke extends irony beyond
literary criticism and applies it as a device to help understand
real-life situations: because irony as dialectic invites in all per-
spectives-not just writer and reader-it "moves us into the area
of 'law' and 'justice.'" 33
The abstract concepts behind the tropes of metonymy and
irony should become more concrete as they are applied in the fol-
lowing sections. Two themes will emerge. First, the attempts to
resolve DBCP claims by forcing litigation in U.S. courts is a meto-
nymic reduction from "justice" to "U.S. trial": by ignoring other
options like banana worker settlement programs, proponents of
blocking statutes were blinded to the already-evident downside of
litigating in the home countries. Second, reading together all the
sub-perspectives on Special Law 364 reveals an irony in that the
moment of its greatest success-multi-million-dollar judgments in
both Los Angeles and Nicaragua-was also the inevitable rever-
sal, the beginning of the end.
Ill. FORUM NON CONVENIENs DISMISSALS OF DBCP CASES
BROUGHT BY FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS
A. DBCP Application, Male Sterility, and the Banana
Industry in Nicaragua
The nematode is a microscopic worm that damages the roots
of crops.34 DBCP was the active ingredient in some nematocides
that were effective in controlling the pest, which allowed for sig-
nificantly larger crop yields." DBCP was applied in the U.S. and
throughout the world on a variety of crops, including bananas in
30. Id. at 517.
31. Id.
32. ABRAMS, supra note 15, at 99.
33. BURKE, supra note 13, at 516.
34. Stecklow, supra note 7.
35. Id.
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Central and South America, the Philippines, and Ivory Coast.
Several Nicaraguan banana farms-which had contracted with
Standard Fruit Company, a subsidiary of Dole-sprayed DBCP
for a few weeks at a time approximately 13 times during the
1970s.3 7
In 1977, three dozen factory workers who manufactured
DBCP at the Occidental Petroleum Corporation plant in Lathrop,
California, learned that they were sterile." Within months, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency suspended the registration
for DBCP, and by 1979 it had cancelled the registration for DBCP
for all uses except pineapples.3 9 The Dole-contracted farms in Nic-
aragua halted DBCP applications shortly thereafter.4 0 Epidemio-
logical studies have shown that overexposure to DBCP can cause
significantly reduced or even zero sperm counts, but there is no
evidence of other harmful effects in humans.4 1
B. DBCP Lawsuits Dismissed Under Forum Non
Conveniens Doctrine
Beginning in the mid-1980s, foreign plaintiffs brought numer-
ous lawsuits against fruit companies and chemical manufacturers
and alleged harm from exposure to DBCP.4 2 Although some cases
were filed in their home countries, the plaintiffs preferred to file
these actions in the United States." Professor Alexandra Albright
writes that an American forum "provides considerable procedural
and substantive advantages over the aliens' home forum."44
For example, unlike most other countries, the American judi-
cial system allows for contingent fee representations and does not
require the losing party to pay the defendants' legal costs.45 U.S.
rules also provide for more sophisticated discovery and evidence,
36. T. Christian Miller, Plantation Workers Look for Justice in the North, L.A.
TIMES, May 27, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/27/nation/na-pesticide27/3.
37. Id.; Meija Findings, supra note 5, 11.
38. Miller, supra note 36.
39. Id. DBCP's use on pineapple farms in Hawaii remained lawful until 1985.
Diana Jean Schemo, U.S. Pesticide Kills Foreign Fruit Pickers' Hopes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/06/world/us-pesticide-kills-foreign-
fruit-pickers-hopes.html?pagewanted=all&src=PM.
40. Stecklow, supra note 7.
41. Miller, supra note 36; see Scott, supra note 1, at 100.
42. Don Mayer & Kyle Sable, Yes! We Have No Bananas: Forum Non Conveniens
and Corporate Evasion, 4 INT'L Bus. L. REV. 130, 153 (2004).
43. Id. at 136-37.
44. Alex Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and




and U.S. courts can better accommodate complex mass tort
actions.46 And perhaps most importantly, U.S. juries award signif-
icantly higher damages, including punitive damages; neither
juries nor punitive damages are available in all countries.4 7
The defendants knew this as well, so they fought to have the
cases removed from the U.S., primarily by seeking dismissal on
the grounds of FNC. A motion to dismiss for FNC does not dispute
that a claim properly falls within the court's jurisdictional rules;
instead, it argues that the claim could be tried more conveniently
in another country.4 8 The federal FNC doctrine was first articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert and Koster
v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., with the only significant
review coming in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.49 A large majority of
states, as well as the District of Columbia and all U.S. territories,
apply essentially the same test as the federal courts."o
The first stage of the analysis asks whether an alternative
forum is available, and if so, whether that forum is adequate. An
alternative foreign forum is available when the defendant is ame-
nable to process in the other jurisdiction."1 An alternative foreign
forum is adequate if the parties will not be deprived of all reme-
dies nor be treated unfairly.5 2 The alternative forum is not inade-
quate merely because it provides the plaintiff with a less generous
remedy than U.S. law: the Piper Aircraft Court held that "[t]he
possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be
given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non con-
veniens inquiry."5
If the foreign alternative forum is found available and ade-
quate, the court considering a motion to dismiss then weighs the
two groups of factors articulated in Gilbert. The private interest
factors are concerned primarily with the difficulty of obtaining
evidence from abroad:
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis,
77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 311 (2002).
49. Id.; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
50. Davies, supra note 48, at 315.
51. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
52. See id. at 255.
53. Id. at 247.
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cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibil-
ity of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.54
The public interest factors relate to functional concerns for the
court considering the motion: administrative difficulties arising
from congestion of court dockets; the burden placed on a jury
required to decide a case with no connection to the community
from which it is drawn; and the desirability of having the dispute
tried in a forum familiar with the governing law."
Defendants in the DBCP cases brought in the 1980s and
1990s argued that the foreign nations had available and adequate
courts and that both groups of factors were satisfied-and the
courts "would always dismiss the lawsuit based on forum non con-
veniens."" For example, in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., Judge Sim
Lake examined the laws of twelve different foreign legal systems
(including Nicaragua) and found that each of them had a legal sys-
tem that would not deprive plaintiffs of all legal remedies, and,
because defendants had stipulated to submit to the jurisdiction of
the foreign courts, those courts were adequate and available."
Courts would then turn to the private and public interest factors
and find that those both weighed heavily in favor of dismissal.
For example, in Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co., which was filed in
Florida by Costa Rican plaintiffs, the district court found that
most of the evidence and witnesses were in Costa Rica, compul-
sory process would not be available to compel production of the
evidence or attendance of the witnesses, and the defendants would
not be able to implead potential third-party defendants." Turning
to the public interest factors, the Sibaja Court found that the case
would contribute to the congestion of the court docket, a complex
comparative law analysis of an unfamiliar legal system in a for-
eign language would be required, and the dispute had no connec-
tion to the community." Nor could plaintiffs avoid FNC dismissal
by litigating in state court. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, the
54. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
55. Id. at 508-09.
56. Mayer & Sable, supra note 42, at 139; see, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F.
Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000); Sibaja v. Dow Chem.
Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985).
57. 890 F. Supp. at 1356-66.
58. 757 F.2d at 1217 n.5.
59. Id.; see Molly M. White, Home Field Advantage: The Exploitation of Federal
Forum Non Conveniens by United States Corporations and Its Effects on International
Environmental Litigation, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 491, 514-15 (1993).
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Supreme Court of Texas had held that dismissal for FNC was
improper because the Legislature had abolished that doctrine
when it enacted the Texas Wrongful Death Statute in 1913.0 Sev-
eral commentators criticized both the outcome and the reasoning
employed in Alfaro, and shortly thereafter, the Texas Legislature
responded by enacting FNC legislation."
IV. PERCEIVED SHORTCOMINGS OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS DISMISSALS IN DBCP CASES
While FNC has its proponents, many commentators-be they
student note writers, torts practitioners, or international law
scholars-attacked the doctrine as applied in DBCP litigation.
Turning back to the language of Burke, we see in the critical
responses on both sides the "developments" that gave birth to
blocking statutes as well as the "inevitable" problems that would
cause these statutes to fail: Latin American fraud and corruption;
ill-equipped courts; and inability to obtain evidence from abroad.
And in many of those who opposed FNC we see the first seeds of
metonymic thinking in the argument that lack of access to a U.S.
court equals a denial of justice.
A. Arguments in Favor of FNC
Several of the primary arguments in favor of FNC are sum-
marized by Professor Albright. One is that FNC avoids paternal-
ism: hearing foreign cases in the U.S. under U.S. law advances
U.S. social policy and disrupts the policy of foreign nations.62 Fur-
ther, other developed nations do not provide a forum for foreign
cases, which puts U.S. corporations at a competitive disadvan-
tage." Another argument is that multinational corporations have
many "homes," so trying cases in a nation closer to the cause of
action is more convenient.6 4 Finally, the courts themselves "dread
the prospect of becoming a 'dumping ground' for the world's tort
60. 786 S.W.2d 674, 674, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
61. Charles Eric Ruhr, Forum Non Conveniens: A Review of Its Application in Past
and Recent Cases, 6 TTLSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 247, 251 (1999); Albright, supra note
44, at 364-68; Bill C. Anderson, Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro: Forum Non Conveniens-
Now Isn't That Convenient?, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 375, 402-03 (1990). For a thorough
discussion of the FNC statute enacted by the Texas Legislature in response to Alfaro,
see Nicola Fuentes, The Re-Establishment of Forum Non Conveniens in Texas: What
Does It Mean?, 24 ST. B. TEX. ENvrL. L.J. 77, 77 (1993).
62. Albright, supra note 44, at 361-62.
63. Id. at 362.
64. Id. at 362-63.
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litigation," so FNC prevents forum shopping.5
The doctrine itself also offers its own defenses: the public and
private interest factors. After all, the court applies these factors
only after first determining whether an alternative and adequate
forum even exists. While the public interest factors offer a justifi-
cation from the perspective of the court, the private interest fac-
tors address the concerns of the defendants: the difficulty of
obtaining evidence from abroad, including the lack of compulsory
process and access to documentary evidence. "When most of the
relevant events occurred in a foreign country, most of the wit-
nesses and evidence will be located in that country as well....
Because these witnesses are located outside of the territorial juris-
diction of the United States, United States courts cannot compel
the attendance of a witness at court via a subpoena. "66
B. Criticisms of FNC
Critics of FNC found these justifications slight when com-
pared to its drawbacks. Indeed, many contended that the applica-
tion of FNC to DBCP litigation highlights the shortcomings of this
doctrine: "While the problems inherent in the doctrine of forum
non conveniens affect virtually any type of claim filed by foreign
plaintiffs, its misuse is particularly egregious in the field of inter-
national environmental litigation."" The criticisms fell into two
categories: the doctrine was misapplied, and the doctrine was
unfair to plaintiffs.
1. Courts Misapplied the Forum Non Conveniens Test
The first group of criticisms was that courts misapplied the
Gilbert and Koster tests and reached incorrect results. Perhaps
the most obvious shortcoming was that these foreign courts were
inadequate. One of the reasons plaintiffs chose to litigate in the
United States is because her courts have the resources and the
body of law to accommodate complex mass tort claims."
By contrast, the courts of the plaintiffs' home countries could
not handle these cases. The DBCP plaintiffs typically came from
65. Id. at 363.
66. Jennifer L. Woulfe, Where Forum Non Conveniens and Preemptive
Jurisdiction Collide: An Analytical Look at Latin American Preemptive Jurisdiction
Laws in the United States, 30 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 171, 195 (2010).
67. White, supra note 59, at 511.
68. See Albright, supra note 44, at 353.
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developing nations, so their judiciary had scarce resources.6 9
Moreover the procedural and administrative mechanisms in Latin
American courts were geared toward resolving individual dis-
putes." Combined, these factors meant that the foreign judges
were ill-equipped to manage the logistics of the claims of hundreds
or even thousands of plaintiffs against multiple defendants."
Another critique regarding adequacy was the presence of judi-
cial corruption and the absence of judicial independence in the
home country.72 Instances of "bribery, abuse, and fraud are well
documented in many legal systems of the Americas."" "The U.S.
State Department reports that fair trials and due process are
often unavailable to those pursuing claims in Latin American
jurisdictions . .. because their courts are often influenced by cor-
ruption."" Indeed a 2004 report authored by Professor John S.
Baker, Jr. for USAID described a "judicial crisis in Nicaragua,"
quoting the Agency's in-country Mission Director James Vermil-
lion as stating "some judges were being politically manipulated.'"'6
That same report added that "appointment of many of these
judges was reportedly achieved through political favor, and few, if
any, have adequate qualifications to serve as judges.""'
Critics also attacked the findings that the private and public
interest factors favored dismissal. The private interest factors
could not be met by dismissal because Latin American courts
either did not provide for-or they curtailed-depositions, discov-
ery, access to witnesses, the use of experts, and the production of
documents." Thus, while one goal in granting dismissal is access
to evidence and witnesses located in the home country, the effect
was actually a loss of evidence." Further, many of the defendants'
witnesses and documents would be located in the United States."
In fact, the potency of the evidence justification for dismissing
69. See Garro, supra note 1, at 84.
70. Id. at 85.
71. Id. at 85-86.
72. Figueroa, supra note 1, at 149.
73. Christopher M. Marlowe, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals and
the Adequate Alternative Forum Question: Latin America, 32 U. MIAIVH INTER-Am. L.
REV. 295, 303 (2001).
74. Id. at 296-97.
75. John S. Baker, Jr. & Agustin Parise, Conflicts in International Tort Litigation
Between U.S. and Latin American Courts, 42 U. MIAI INTER-Am. L. REV. 1, 15 (2010).
76. Id. at 15-16.
77. Garro, supra note 1, at 91-94.
78. See Saint Dahl, supra note 1, at 37.
79. White, supra note 59, at 529-30.
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to the home country had been diminished by the Hague conven-
tion and new technologies-including videoconferencing and vide-
otaped depositions-which afford access to witnesses and
evidence located abroad."
Nor did the commentators think that the public interest fac-
tors were satisfied. They argued that there was no evidence of a
flood of foreign cases into U.S. jurisdictions." And the cases bore
a significant relationship to the U.S. forum: not only did the prof-
its earned overseas flow back to the U.S.,8 2 but U.S. citizens had
an interest in deterring domestic corporations from engaging in
harmful conduct, both here and abroad."
2. Forum Non Conveniens Is Not Fair to Foreign
Plaintiffs
The second group of criticisms was that FNC is not fair to
foreign plaintiffs. For example, although the general rule is that
the plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to deference, the applica-
tion of FNC meant that a foreign plaintiffs choice received less
deference than a domestic plaintiffs.84 As another example, Latin
American jurisdictions often require the losing side to pay the
winning side's costs, and they do not allow contingency fee agree-
ments." The foreign DBCP plaintiff, who was often indigent,
therefore could not afford to bring an action in his home court.8 6
Ultimately, FNC tended to be outcome determinative: once
dismissed, the claims were not usually tried elsewhere." One sur-
vey showed that only one of over fifty personal injury actions that
were dismissed for FNC was actually tried in a foreign court."
Another survey of 85 cases revealed that 18 were not pursued fur-
ther, 22 settled for less than half the estimated value, and not one
proceeded to a courtroom victory in the foreign forum."
Given that venue and jurisdiction over the defendants was
80. Davies, supra note 48, at 326-27, 333.
81. Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 650, 676
(1992).
82. Id. at 675.
83. White, supra note 59, at 522-23 (citing Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 260-61
(1981)).
84. White, supra note 59, at 528-29.
85. Garro, supra note 1, at 89.
86. Id. at 88-91.
87. White, supra note 59, at 518-20.




proper in the United States, and that the defendants were corpo-
rations with substantial operations in the United States, these
critics concluded that application of FNC led to inequitable
results."o "As demonstrated, U.S. courts engage in foreign policy
through FNC, having held over and over that U.S. corporations
doing business in Latin America cannot be held liable in U.S.
courts for actions that occurred in Latin America.""
Such criticisms can be understood as a metonymic reduction
because they equate justice-a higher or more complex realm of
being-with a U.S. court trial-a lower or less complex realm of
being. Many critics used language that described "justice" for the
workers in terms of a U.S. trial. Consider the claim of one student
note writer: "The goal of a forum non conveniens analysis is to
ensure that the case is tried in the forum that 'will best serve the
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.' If the case is
not tried at all, this goal is not met."9 2
Another writer bemoaned the fact that "none of the reported
cases ended with a courtroom victory."" One critic argued that
the claim "must eventually be heard in some court."9 4 And that
court must be in the U.S.: "Without the opportunity to litigate in
the United States, foreign plaintiffs from less developed countries
are left without any forum for redress because the judicial systems
of their countries are often plagued with 'inadequacies in . . . law,
procedures or available remedies.""'
V. LATIN AMERICA RESPONDS WITH BLOCKING STATUTES-
A METONYMIC REDUCTION
Several Latin American countries agreed that a trial in the
90. See, e.g., Donna Solen, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and the
International Plaintiff, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 343, 343, 349-51 (1994) ("Forum non
conveniens has been used as a tool by U.S. corporations to evade responsibility for
their conduct abroad.").
91. Figueroa, supra note 1, at 168.
92. Megan Waples, Note, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non
Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REv. 1475, 1512 (2004) (punctuation and
citation omitted).
93. Solen, supra note 90, at 350.
94. Marlowe, supra note 73, at 303-04.
95. Rosemary H. Do, Note & Comments, Not Here, Not There, Not Anywhere:
Rethinking the Enforceability of Foreign Judgments with Respect to the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations and the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act of 1962 in Light of Nicaragua's DBCP Litigation, 14 Sw. J.L. & TRADE Am. 409,
418 (2008); see Figueroa, supra note 1, at 137 ("Basically, the only option available to
the Latin American plaintiff [following forum non conveniens dismissal] is to re-file in
her home country jurisdiction.").
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U.S. offered their citizens the only chance of justice: those coun-
tries enacted retaliatory legislation in the form of blocking stat-
utes, laws intended to prevent FNC dismissal from U.S. courts.9 6
Such metonymic reduction ignored that justice can be achieved
via means outside of trial, such as settlement programs. More sig-
nificantly, metonymic thinking created blinders to the negative
consequences that forcing litigation in the U.S. would inevitably
create.
A. Alternatives to U.S. Trial
At least one approach to "justice" for injured workers lay
outside of U.S. courts. In 2006 Dole established a settlement pro-
gram with banana workers and the Honduran government that
was 10 years in the making." Under the Honduran program,
workers who could verify employment and sterility received settle-
ments up to $5,800." Dole also attempted to establish a similar
program with injured workers in Nicaragua if that country would
have repealed Special Law 364." While modest by American stan-
dards, $5,800 represents five times the average annual per capita
income in Nicaragua, $1,126.100
However, U.S. Plaintiffs' attorneys representing foreign
plaintiffs in DBCP suits called the settlement program a "'cynical
effort to prevent those cases from going to lawyers who would pur-
sue significantly greater value.""'o Likewise, scholars character-
ized settlements where plaintiffs received as much as half of the
theoretical amounts they could have received in the U.S. as inade-
quate.102 Accordingly, this alternative was largely ignored in favor
of pursuing blocking statutes that would force access to U.S.
courts.
96. See Figueroa, supra note 1, at 156.
97. David Hechler, The Kill Step, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Oct. 2009, at 90.
Commentators have suggested other options as well, such as multinational treaties.
See Figueroa, supra note 1, at 168-69.
98. Hechler, supra note 97, at 90.
99. Do, supra note 95, at 414.
100. Bureau of W. Hemisphere Affairs, , Background Note: Nicaragua, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/palei/bgn/1850.htm.
101. Hechler, supra note 97, at 90. While the DBCP plaintiffs themselves tend to
be poor, it should be noted that they are represented by some of the most
sophisticated U.S. plaintiffs' attorneys. See James M. Sabovich, Petition Without
Prejudice: Against the Fraud Exception to Noerr-Pennington Immunity From the Toxic
Tort Perspective, 17 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2008).
102. See, e.g., Figueroa, supra note 1, at 153.
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B. Latin American Blocking Statutes In General
The blocking statutes followed one of two basic forms: they
either eliminated the jurisdiction of the local forum, thus render-
ing the home country "unavailable"; or they expressly allowed for
jurisdiction in the local forum but with such onerous provisions
that defendants would choose to remain in the U.S. rather than
appear in a jurisdiction where an adverse finding was "all but
assured.""o'
The first approach was comparatively benign: the blocking
statute extinguished the jurisdiction of the home country to con-
sider a claim once that claim was first filed in the U.S. Thus, by
statute, no court of the home country would be "available" because
this part of the FNC test was not met.104 Professor Heiser writes
that "a handful of [U.S.] courts have followed this line of reasoning
and denied motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens."os At
least five countries have this type of blocking statute in place:
Gauatemala, Ecuador, Honduras, Venezuela, and the Philip-
pines.1 06 Although the Costa Rican legislature declined to pass a
similar statute in 1997,07 at least one court has nevertheless
found that that country is unavailable once a claim is filed in the
U.S. 08
The second form of blocking statute, on its face at least, estab-
lished procedural and evidentiary rules for trying DBCP cases in
the home country. The intended effect, however, was to make
trial in the foreign country less appealing than trial in the U.S.,
thus dissuading defendants from even attempting to dismiss for
FNC.'09 These statutes achieved this by imposing strict liability,
providing damages at a level equivalent to U.S. standards, requir-
ing the posting of bonds, and establishing summary proceed-
ings."0 Two countries passed this form of blocking statute:
103. Scott, supra note 1, at 99.
104. Heiser, supra note 1, at 622.
105. Id. at 624.
106. Id. at 623; Figueroa, supra note 1, at 157-58. Though several Ecuadorian
courts have held that Law 55 prohibits jurisdiction following dismissal for FNC, the
Ecuadorian Constitutional Court has declared Law 55 unconstitutional. Compare
Garro, supra note 1, at 78-79, with Figueroa, supra note 1, at 158.
107. Garro, supra note 1, at 81.
108. Heiser, supra note 1, at 623; see Canales Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F.
Supp. 2d 719, 728 (E.D. La. 2002).
109. Heiser, supra note 1, at 622; see Woulfe, supra note 66, at 176 ("Special Law
364 still has the effect of pushing the case into the United States.").
110. Scott, supra note 1, 100-01; Figueroa, supra note 1, at 156.
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Dominica and Nicaragua."'
C. Nicaragua Special Law 364
In response to FNC dismissals in cases like Delgado,
thousands of persons who claimed injury from exposure to DBCP
organized into "unions" and, aided by U.S. plaintiffs attorneys,
lobbied the Nicaraguan Legislature to pass Special Law 364.112
Enacted in late 2000 and published in early 2001, Special Law 364
is more formally called Special Law for the Conduct of Lawsuits
Filed by Persons Affected by the Use of Pesticides Manufactured
with a DBCP Base.'1 3 By its very terms, Special Law 364 attempts
to defeat FNC dismissals of DBCP cases. Article 7, in conjunction
with Articles 4 and 5, prevents a defendant who is first sued in
Nicaragua from asserting FNC if the case is later refiled in the
U.S. Special Law 364 requires that, "[t]o guarantee the outcome
of the lawsuit, the defendants are to deposit, within ninety (90)
days after the respective lawsuits have been brought before the
courts of the Republic, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars
... as a procedural prerequisite for being able to take part in the
lawsuit." 4 If the defendants choose not to post the $100,000 bond
within 90 days, however, then they "must subject themselves
unconditionally to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States of America for the final judgment of the case in question,
expressly waiving the defense of forum non conveniens invoked in
those courts.""1
Other provisions of Special Law 364 operate to encourage
defendants to litigate in the U.S., or, more accurately, to discour-
age them from litigating in Nicaragua. Article 3 does authorize
jurisdiction in Nicaraguan courts following dismissal from a U.S.
court."' However, other provisions ensure that no defendant
would seek dismissal. For example, in addition to the $100,000
bond, Article 8 requires defendants to post a $300 million cordoba
bond (roughly U.S. $15 million) "in order to guarantee payment of
111. Heiser, supra note 1, at 628.
112. Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally:
Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 456, 490 (2010); David Gonzalez & Samuel Loewenberg, Banana Workers Get Day
in Court, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/
18/business/worldbusiness/18BANA.html?pagewanted=all.
113. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, app. I at 1353-55 (S.D. Fla.
2009).




the possible compensation to the workers and other costs of the
lawsuit.""' Article 9 presumes causation: if someone was exposed
to DBCP and provides two lab reports showing sterility, then
there is an "irrefutable presumption that such condition was
caused by the same."" Article 11 provides minimum damages of
$100,000 for azoospermia (zero sperm count), $50,000 for severe
oligospermia (low sperm count), and $25,000 for other injuries. 9
This is in addition to the $100,000 that each successful plaintiff
shall be awarded under Article 3.120 Article 12 establishes an
"unavoidable 3-8-3 term," meaning 3 days for defendants to
answer the claim, 8 days for parties to offer evidence, and 3 days
for the court to issue a decision. 1 21 Finally, Article 6 provides that
claims are "not subject to a statute of limitations."'2 '
The Nicaraguan Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional-
ity of Special Law 364 in an advisory opinion. 123 The Nicaraguan
Attorney General had issued an opinion singling out several provi-
sions of Special Law 364 that he thought violated Nicaragua's con-
stitution or that deviated from established Nicaraguan law.124 For
example, he found the 3-8-3 summary procedure was inappropri-
ate for complex cases, the disparate treatment of defendants and
plaintiffs violated the constitutional right of equality, and the
deposit for future compensation assumed that a ruling for plain-
tiffs was taken for granted.125 The Supreme Court disagreed. It
held that the "Principle of Equality" meant that the law merely
provided "positive discrimination" by ameliorating the disadvan-
tages to poor plaintiffs.126 The Court also held that Special Law
364 comported with due process because it gave defendants the
right to opt out of litigation in Nicaragua and instead choose a
117. Id.
118. Id. While only sterility is presumed, the language of Law 364 is broad enough
to encompass claims for other types of injuries. Article 5 provides that the $100,000
bond "shall be considered as part of future compensation that the affected persons
may receive for any physical, psychological or pathological deformation resulting from
sterility, cancer and other illnesses and physical damage and pain and suffering that
may be confirmed, as a result of the use and application of the pesticide DBCP." Id.
119. Id. at 1354-55.
120. Id. at 1355.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1354.
123. Saint Dahl, supra note 1, app. at 53-57 (Consultation to the Judges of the
Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua (Nicar. Oct. 16, 2003)).
124. Id. at 53.
125. Id.; Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1315-17 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
126. Saint Dahl, supra note 1, app. at 55 (Consultation to the Judges of the
Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua (Nicar. Oct. 16, 2003)).
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U.S. forum. 127 Thus, defendants could avoid the strictures of Spe-
cial Law 364 altogether.
D. Commentators' Responses to Special Law 364
The academic response to Special Law 364 was mixed.
Among the negative critiques, even some who advocate change to
the FNC calculus criticized the law. Professor Garro called block-
ing statutes in general, "not only unnecessary but also counter-
productive. Several provisions are patently unconstitutional and
others appear highly questionable.""' Dante Figueroa wrote that
blocking statutes, "have only contributed to aggravate the FNC
impasse."129 Casey and Ristroph argued that blocking statutes
contribute to boomerang litigation, in which cases refiled in Latin
Americamust then be filed a third time in U.S. Courts, either after
the Latin American court denied jurisdiction or as an enforcement
action.' Professor Scott condemned Special Law 364 for contain-
ing, "very harsh measures," so that ". . .[d]efendants thus face a
no-win scenario: either litigate in the wrong place or litigate in the
right place with unfair procedures."13 ' He suggested new federal
legislation requiring U.S. courts to dismiss cases premised on
blocking statutes and to refuse to enforce judgments obtained
under them.132
Professor Heiser's critique was more moderate. He thinks
that the preemptive jurisdiction statutes, which merely make the
home country statutorily unavailable, can "effectively counter dis-
missal."'3 3 Potential problems could arise, however, from a judg-
ment obtained in Nicaragua that is then brought to the U.S. for
enforcement under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recog-
nition Act. The presumption of causation, minimum damages,
required bonds, and expedited procedures under Special Law 364
raise procedural and substantive due process concerns that "make
enforcement under the UFMJRA less than certain.""3 However,
he sees no problems with enforcement if the action was first filed
127. Id.
128. Garro, supra note 1, at 78. W
129. Figueroa, supra note 1, at 156.
130. M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient is
Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV.
21, 31-32 (2007).
131. Scott, supra note 1, at 100-02.
132. Id. at 102-04.
133. Heiser, supra note 1, at 658.
134. Id. at 660.
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in the U.S., then defendants moved for dismissal knowing that
Special Law 364 was in place."'
Others have come out squarely in favor of blocking statutes in
general and Special Law 364 in particular. For example, Winston
Anderson praised the blocking statute of Dominica, writing that it
"deserves the highest commendation" as a "landmark develop-
ment in 'checkmating' the pernicious effects of forum non con-
veniens.""3 Regarding Special Law 364, Mayer and Sable
attacked corporate defendants who in the 1990's argued that Nic-
aragua offered an adequate forum and then "contradictorily"
objected that Special Law 364 offends American notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 137 They concluded that if a U.S. court
were to deny enforcement, it would be a "direct challenge to the
sovereignty of the foreign state" by "declaring a public act con-
trary to customary international law [and] challenging the Nica-
raguan judiciary's use of that legislative act."138 Rosencranz,
Roblin, and Balloffet characterized blocking statutes as "human-
rights laws," and they wrote that Special Law 364 "enables [Nica-
raguan] citizens to hold transnationals accountable.""' One stu-
dent commentator claimed that the blocking statutes "have done
much to combat the effects of forum non conveniens," and Special
Law 364 in particular "is a more direct attack on the procedural
doctrine.. . [and] more likely to achieve the long-standing goal of
thousands of victimized foreign laborers-corporate accountabil-
ity."140 He concluded that "[w]orkers in Nicaragua will receive
their justice." 14 1 The irony of this pronouncement will become
apparent in the next two sections, which describe how the effects
of Special Law 364 have been anything but justice, for either the
banana workers or the multinational corporations.
VI. THE REVERSAL: SPECIAL LAw 364 As
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPETUS FOR FRAUD
In classical drama, the action accelerates as the play draws
135. Id. at 660-61.
136. Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?-The Emergence of
Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 215 (2001).
137. Mayer & Sable, supra note 42, at 163.
138. Id. at 163-64.
139. Armin Rosencranz, Stephen Roblin, & Nicole Balloffet, Doling Out
Environmental Justice to Nicaraguan Banana Workers: The Jose Adolfo Tellez v. Dole
Food Company Litigation in the U.S. Courts, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 167,
178 (2009).
140. Santoyo, supra note 1, at 729.
141. Id. at 736.
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closer to the reversal. Similarly, U.S. plaintiffs' attorneys
responded enthusiastically to Special Law 364; after all, they had
helped draft and usher the law through the Nicaraguan legisla-
ture. 142 They set up offices in northwest Nicaragua in the city of
Chinandega, the heart of the country's banana region.14 3 They
filed hundreds of lawsuits on behalf of thousands of plaintiffs,
both in Nicaragua and in several state and federal courts. By
2003, over 7,000 plaintiffs had filed 400 cases seeking more than
$9.6 billion in damages.'4 4 As of 2009, Nicaraguan courts had
issued judgments in 32 of those cases totaling $2.05 billion.145
Thousands of claims were filed in Los Angeles County, and in
2007 the first bellwether case, Tellez, went to trial and resulted in
a $2.3 million verdict for six plaintiffs. 4 6 However, Tellez would
prove to be the "peripety": just as Special Law 364 had seemingly
delivered a U.S. court victory for Nicaraguan plaintiffs, the devel-
opments that gave rise to this law "inevitably" reached the atten-
tion of two U.S. courts. Rather than offer plaintiffs a trial on the
merits of their negligence and products liability claims, Special
Law 364 was itself put on trial. This "further course of the[ I
development" of Special Law 364 put the Tellez judgments-and
the claims of all Nicaraguans-into jeopardy.
A. Mejia v. Dole Food Co.: Original Action in U.S.
Dismissed as Fraud on the Court
Mejia was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court, and
Hollywood seems to have scripted the findings in this case. Judge
Chaney held a three-day hearing pursuant to an order to show
cause re terminating sanctions why Mejia should not be dismissed
with prejudice.147 Discovery in Mejia had been conducted under a
Protective Order because of danger of annoyance, oppression, and
potential intimidation of witnesses.'4 8 Accordingly, portions of the
142. Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 112, at 490-91.
143. Id. at 492. ; Miller, supra note 36; Stecklow, supra note 7.
144. Gonzalez & Loewenberg, supra note 112.
145. Edvard Pettersson & Mort Lucoff, Dole Fights Workers' Nicaraguan Verdict in
U.S. Court, BLOOMBERG.COM(Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aijxiWsRnvGnY.
146. Judgment on Jury Verdict and Post-Trial Orders at 4, Tellez v. Dole Food Co.,
Case No. BC312852 (L.A. Cnty. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2008) (The jury had awarded a
total of $5.8 million against Dole and Dow in damages, and after a JNOV and motion
for new trial, the final judgment was reduced to a combined $2.3 million); see also
Pettersson, supra note 4.
147. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, T 57, 69.
148. Id. T 33.
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hearing were conducted in closed court, and several video deposi-
tion snippets were shown that pixelated the images and altered
the voices of the witnesses.' A few live witnesses, including two
of Dole's investigators, also testified."'o These witnesses described
a massive fraudulent enterprise, driven by plaintiffs' attorneys
and corrupt government officials, to recruit thousands of bogus
plaintiffs for the purpose of extorting billions of dollars out of the
defendant transnational companies. And the "impetus" behind
the scheme was Special Law 364.151
Like its sister case Tellez, Mejia had started as a tort action
brought by persons who claimed to have been injured while work-
ing on Dole-contracted farms in Nicaragua in the 1970s.'5 2 After
the verdicts in Tellez, a "Witness X" had come forward with allega-
tions of fraud by plaintiffs and their attorneys, but, because of
threats against him, he refused to testify or sign a declaration."'
Further, the Court lacked any authority to compel Witness X's tes-
timony, or the testimony of any Nicaraguan or the production of
any documents located in Nicaragua, because there are no treaties
between the United States and Nicaragua that govern the gather-
ing of evidence.1 54 However Dole acted on this suspicion of fraud
and gathered 10 declarations from witnesses who recounted that
plaintiffs had never worked on banana farms, that plaintiffs were
not sterile, that plaintiffs' attorneys were engaged in fraud, and
that the attorneys engaged in acts of intimidation.' Based on
these declarations, the Court entered a Protective Order so that
Defendants could notice and take "John Doe" depositions to
uncover admissible evidence of the potential fraud.5"' Dole had
already taken 17 depositions and had noticed several more when,
because of threats of violence and other intimidation in Nicara-
gua, the Court halted discovery and entered the OSC re terminat-
ing sanctions.5"'
149. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 792:8-12, Mejia, No. BC340049 (L.A.
Cnty. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2009); Hechler, supra note 97, at 90; Catherine Ho, Over
Objections, "Documentary" About Banana Workers Is Screened, THE L.A. DAILY J.,
June 23, 2009; Deutsch, supra note 7; Keating, supra note 7.
150. Transcript of Oral Argument at 792:8-12, Mejia, No. BC340049 (L.A. Cnty.
Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2009).
151. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 1 73.
152. Id. $1 11, 17.




157. Id. 1 43, 57-58.
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Judge Chaney found that "[a]n entire industry has developed
around DBCP litigation in Nicaragua for the purpose of bringing
fraudulent claims.""' At least four law firms-including the
Oficinas Legales Para Los Bananeros of Juan Dominguez and
Antonio Hernandez Ordefiana, who represented the plaintiffs in
Mejia and Tellez-operated out of Chinandega.6' Although these
firms initially attempted to recruit legitimate banana workers,
there were too few men who had worked at the Dole-contracted
farms from the 1970s-and too few of them for whom lab results
showed sterility-to make the enterprise profitable."'o The firms
therefore conspired and colluded with each other, with Nicara-
guan laboratories, and with corrupt Nicaraguan judges in a posi-
tion to influence the outcome of DBCP cases, in order "to
manufacture evidence and improperly influence the outcome of
DBCP cases pending in Nicaraguan courts in favor of Plaintiffs."1 6 1
In furtherance of the conspiracy, "recruiting captains were
issued 'guidelines' instructing them to bring in as many men as
possible, regardless of whether they had ever worked on a banana
farm."1 62 They recruited from the poorest areas of Nicaragua-
persons "thought most susceptible to exploitation.""' In return for
the promise of an imminent windfall, recruits had to pay to attend
monthly meetings, receive training materials, and participate in
field trips to the farms. 164 Next, the captains coached the recruits
to give false testimony with the assistance of "brochures" that con-
tained information about the farms in general, agricultural jobs in
particular, tasks associated with those jobs, and names and physi-
cal descriptions of farm personnel. 6' All personnel records from
the banana farms had been destroyed after the Sandinistas took
control of the banana farms.16 6 Accordingly, the firms manufac-
tured false employment histories in the form of "work certificates"
signed by former banana farm supervisors that purported to verify
the plaintiffs work on the farm."' The plaintiffs' firms paid for-
mer banana farm captains, managers, and supervisors to sign the
forms in blank, and law firm employees later filled in the forms
158. Id. 75.
159. Id.
160. Id. T 77-78.
161. Id. 79.





167. Id. 9 82.
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with information for individual plaintiffs. 16  The final step was to
fake plaintiffs' sterility. In addition to telling plaintiffs simply to
lie about the number of children they had and the existence of
children born after alleged exposure to DBCP, the law firms
rigged sperm tests-such as by sneaking in donor sperm.' The
firms eventually paid four Nicaraguan labs to provide test results
showing sterility, without doing an analysis, and often without
even requiring the plaintiff to produce a sample."o The final
aspect of the conspiracy was to keep it hidden, which attorneys
and their agents attempted to do through a variety of means rang-
ing from radio broadcasts requesting that the listeners not cooper-
ate with Dole's investigators to personal meetings encouraging
potential witnesses to remain silent, from death threats slipped
under doors to a false criminal complaint filed by Ordefiana
against one of Dole's investigators."'
Judge Chaney found that "Special Law 364 was a significant
impetus in establishing [this] industry that developed around
DBCP litigation in Nicaragua for the purpose of bringing fraudu-
lent claims."'72 Special Law 364 was so lopsided in plaintiffs'
favor, both in terms of procedural devices and minimum damages,
that it attracted multiple law firms to Nicaragua, but they all
competed for the same handful of legitimate clients.




171. Id. 1 102-119. Seemingly to question the legitimacy of the Mejia findings,
and their applicability to Tellez, Rosencranz, Roblin & Balloffet employ language that
downplays the OSC proceedings. They refer to "allegations" of fraud against "some of
the lawyers who represented the plaintiffs," state that Mejia was "brought on behalf
of Nicaraguan banana plantation workers," and claim that Dole submitted the
depositions of "unidentified witnesses" as proof of this fraud. Rosencranz et al., supra
note 139, at 175-76. As the discussion above shows, however, Mejia is a final ruling
(it was not challenged by appeal) where the Court found that some attorneys as well
as all of the plaintiffs had engaged in a massive fraudulent scheme; it further found
that nine of the eleven plaintiffs had not been banana farm workers, and that none of
them had worked on a Dole-contracted farm as they had claimed; and it relied upon
the depositions of credible John Doe witnesses, the identities of whom were known to
the Court and counsel for all parties. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, ' 3, 7, 33, 70, 89,
101.
172. Mejia Findings, supra note 5 $ 73. In her oral ruling, Judge Chaney found
that "the advent of Law 364 was a significant impetus in planting and nourishing a
fraudulent industry whose roots may have its origins in Nicaraguan courts but whose
fraudulent shoots have reached into the soil of the court systems in the United States,
and specifically in California." Transcript of Oral Argument at 803:18-23, Mejia, Case
No. BC30049 (L.A. Cnty. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2009).
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companies, including Defendants Dole and Dow."'n While the
procedural requirements of Special Law 364 took a "heavy toll" on
defendants, the "vast majority of . .. plaintiffs" who litigated in
Nicaragua under Special Law 364 did not make an appearance in
court or submit to medical testing.17 4 The Court's findings show
how plaintiff-friendly and defendant-adverse Special Law 364 is:
Under Special Law 364, essentially anyone who obtains the
two required lab reports stating he is sterile and who
claims to have been exposed to DBCP on a banana farm is
entitled to damages; causation and liability are conclu-
sively presumed and the minimum statutory damages pro-
vided for in the law are modeled on U.S. jury verdicts, far in
excess of any other awards ever handed down in Nicaragua.
To simply appear in court to defend itself, a defendant must
post bonds of 300 million cordobas (currently more than
$15 million). Furthermore, cases under Special law 364 are
required to follow a 3-8-3 format, in which a defendant has
just 3 days to answer the complaint, the parties have 8
days to present evidence, and the court has 3 Days to issue
a judgment."'
In addition to establishing minimum, U.S.-sized damages,
Special Law 364 demonstrated that it existed for profits because
of the driving force behind its creation: it was "passed by the Nica-
raguan legislature in 2001 in response to lobbying by a group of
Nicaraguan and U.S. plaintiffs' attorneys.""' Those who pushed
Special Law 364 through failed to account for one effect: increased
competition from modern-day legal carpetbaggers. After all, Juan
Dominguez did not even begin his operations in Chinandega until
2002, two years after other firms had already started to solicit cli-
ents."' Multiple firms were therefore competing for the same
finite resources: men who had worked on banana farms three
decades ago and were now sterile."' When recruiters were unable
to find enough legitimate clients to turn a profit, they turned to
recruiting illegitimate clients."' By promoting profits over due
process, Special Law 364 had provided the means to an unjust
end, and the beginning of the end of DBCP litigation.
173. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 72.
174. Id.; Transcript of Oral Argument at 803:13-15, Mejia, No. BC30049 (Apr. 23,
2009).
175. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 1 73.
176. Id. at 1 72.
177. Stecklow, supra note 7.
178. Mejia Findings, supra note 5 1 77-78.
179. Id.; see Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 112, at 493-94.
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B. Osorio v. Dole Food Co.: Enforcement of
Underlying Nicaraguan Judgment Denied
Though Osorio lacks the drama of Mejia, it compensates by
flashing the cash: A Nicaraguan trial court had already awarded
the plaintiffs almost $100 million, with another $800 million
awarded by the same judge to over 1200 plaintiffs in the sister
case Herrera Rios v. Standard Fruit Co.'"8 In fact, Nicaraguan
courts to date have awarded over $2 billion in judgments, which is
approximately one-third the gross national product of that entire
country."' So when Judge Huck found that Special Law 364 was
unconstitutional and rendered under a corrupt judicial system, he
instantly erased the potential for U.S. dollars.
The underlying lawsuit in Osorio was filed pursuant to Spe-
cial Law 364 in February 2002 in Chinandega, Nicaragua by 201
plaintiffs. 18 2 All of the plaintiffs claimed to have worked at Dole-
contracted banana farms where they were exposed to DBCP man-
ufactured by Dow Chemical Company, Shell Oil Company, and
Occidental Petroleum Corporation.183 Although Dole and Dow
refused to make the deposits required under Special Law 364 and
thereby agreed to subject themselves to jurisdiction in the U.S.,
the trial court exempted them from the bond based on "express
waiver of the Plaintiffs.""' Dow declined to participate further
because it did not wish to be perceived as having waived its juris-
dictional objections, but Dole remained in Nicaragua and
defended itself under protest."' Of the 150 plaintiffs who pre-
vailed, 148 submitted spermograms with diagnoses that showed
they suffered from a variety of sperm impairments; only 10 of the
plaintiffs testified.'8 6 Dole's requests to have an independent doc-
tor examine the individual plaintiffs, to depose the laboratory
technicians who took the spermograms, and to submit birth certif-
icates showing that many of the plaintiffs had fathered children
after their alleged exposure to DBCP were all denied.' The trial
180. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311-12 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
181. Id. at 1338.
182. Id. at 1318.
183. Id. at 1311-12. Judge Huck had earlier dismissed Occidental and Shell from
the lawsuit because they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nicaragua. Id. at
1311 n.1.
184. Id. at 1318. Defendants appealed the interlocutory order denying their
jurisdictional challenge, but that appeal was still pending as of the time of Judge
Huck's order. Id. at 1318-19.
185. Id. at 1319.
186. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
187. Id.
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court awarded the 150 prevailing plaintiffs a total of $97.4 million,
an average award of $650,000.18 For each successful plaintiff, the
Judgment cites the opinion of the court-appointed medical expert
that the particular plaintiff "is infertile" and states a "possible
link" between DBCP exposure and various psychological or physi-
cal problems.'
The prevailing plaintiffs sought recognition of this award in
the Circuit Court of Miami-Dade County in August 2007, but the
defendants removed to district court.'90 In response to cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court bifurcated the case,
holding an evidentiary hearing on September 1-4, 2009, in which
"[bioth sides submitted substantial expert testimony and docu-
mentary evidence . . .. on the Nicaraguan judicial system, Special
Law 364, and the specific Nicaraguan trial proceedings in this
case."' 9'
The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether ...
(1) the Nicaraguan trial court lacked personal and subject
matter jurisdiction over the Defendants, (2) the underlying
judgment was rendered under a system which does not pro-
vide procedures compatible with the international concept
of due process of law, (3) the cause of action or claim of
relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the
public policy of the State of Florida, and (4) the judgment
was rendered under a system without impartial
tribunals.192
Each of these grounds is alone sufficient to deny recognition of the
judgment, and Judge Huck found for Dole and Dow on all four.1 3
The Nicaraguan court denied defendants their right to opt out
of Nicaragua's jurisdiction as provided by Special Law 364, so that
court lacked jurisdiction over them.'9 4 The Court found that Spe-
cial Law 364 was a blocking statute, "a law that closes the doors of
a foreign country's courts to prevent a United States court from
finding that an alternative forum exists under the forum non con-
veniens doctrine."'95 Special Law 364 is "somewhat unique among
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1320.
190. Id. at 1321.
191. Id. at 1321-22. Though Mejia made findings that indicated fraud in Osorio, the
bifurcation eliminated any consideration of this fraud evidence. Id. at 1321, n.7.
192. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
193. Id. at 1321.
194. Id.at 1326.
195. Id. at 1325.
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blocking statutes because it establishes onerous conditions and
then provides defendants with the right to opt out of jurisdiction
in Nicaragua.1 96
In light of the onerous conditions imposed on DBCP defend-
ants by Special Law 364, the history of the DBCP litigation,
the Nicaraguan legislature's reaction to the dismissal of
DBCP claims in Delgado, and the acknowledged discrimi-
natory treatment of DBCP defendants in Nicaragua, it is
not undue speculation to infer that Special Law 364 may
not have been primarily intended for the actual litigation of
cases in Nicaragua, but instead to provide Nicaraguan
plaintiffs with a forum in the United States."'
The opt-out provision goes hand-in-hand with the denial of due
process: by depriving defendants of due process in an effort to
mount a defense, Special Law 364 provides "ample incentives" to
exercise the opt-out right.19 8
Special Law 364 fails to comport with international standards
of due process for a number of reasons. First, Special Law 364
creates an irrefutable presumption that exposure to DBCP causes
sterility, which is inconsistent with medical and scientific facts.199
Not only does Special Law 364 exempt plaintiffs from having to
prove causation, it ensures that scientific evidence that conclu-
sively rebuts this presumption "will have no effect on the outcome
of the litigation."20 0 Indeed, the evidence submitted to the Nicara-
guan trial court supported a finding of sterility for only 9 of the
150 plaintiffs who recovered.2 0 1 "In this way, Special Law 364
deprives defendants of any meaningful opportunity to contest the
essential allegation against them-that DBCP caused a plaintiffs
sterility."2 0 2 Thus by allowing for damages without regard for
fault, Special Law 364 denies basic fairness under both domestic
and international concepts of due process.2 03
Second, the specific procedural mechanisms of Special Law
364 also violate due process, in particular because they discrimi-
nate against a handful of U.S. companies.2 0 4 For example, the law
196. Id. at 1325.
197. Id. at 1324.
198. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
199. Id. at 1327.
200. Id. at 1332.
201. Id. at 1328.
202. Id. at 1332.
203. Id. at 1335.
204. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1335-36.
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provides for minimum damages of $125,000, while other Nicara-
guan statutes provide for maximum damages of $6,000.205 Special
Law 364 additionally requires defendants to pay millions of dol-
lars in deposits as a condition to defend themselves while plain-
tiffs enjoy the presumption of indigence.20 6 Special Law 364
further limits the right to appeal to an intermediate appellate
court and without a stay of execution. 20 7 The 3-8-3 procedure
allows only eight days for the submission of evidence, compared
with the standard procedure in Nicaragua of 20 days.2 08 "It
appears that the clear intent of requiring a 3-8-3 summary pro-
ceeding was to unfairly fast track these substantial and complex
cases, and thereby deny DBCP defendants sufficient time to pre-
sent an adequate defense. "209 Finally, Special Law 364 abolished
the statute of limitations and imposed retrospective liability.2 1 0
Both on their face and as applied by the Nicaraguan trial court,
these procedures denied defendants due process.2 11 "The Court,
therefore, finds that Defendants have met their burden of proving
that the legal regime set up by Special Law 364 and applied in
this case does not comport with the 'basic fairness' that the 'inter-
national concept of due process' requires. It does not even come
close."212
The opt-out provision and onerous provisions of Special Law
364 combined for a Catch 22 that operated to deny enforcement:
"either DBCP defendants have a right to opt out of Nicaragua's
jurisdiction, which requires that the Court deny recognition under
FLA. STAT. 55.605 § (1)(b)-(c), or they are subject to a legal regime
that does not provide due process, which requires denying recogni-
tion under FLA. STAT. 55.605.605 § (1)(a)."2 1 3
After finding that the irrefutable presumption of causation
violates Florida public policy,2 14 the Court turned to the partiality
205. Id. at 1337-38. In comparison, typical damages in wrongful death cases are
$10,000. Id. at 1338.
206. Id. at 1338-39.
207. Id. at 1339-40.
208. Id. at 1340.
209. Id. at 1340. Further, although the 3-8-3 procedures are non-waivable, the trial
court extended the evidentiary period-to permit plaintiffs to offer more evidence. Id.
at 1340-41.
210. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
211. Id. at 1341-43.
212. Id. at 1345 (citing Soc'y of Lloyds v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir.
2000)).
213. Id. at 1325.
214. Id. at 1347.
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of the Nicaraguan judiciary. "[T]he unanimous view among
United States government organizations and officials (including
United States ambassadors to Nicaragua), foreign governments,
international organizations, and credible Nicaraguan authorities,
is that the judicial branch in Nicaragua is dominated by political
forces and, in general, does not dispense impartial justice."2 15 The
Court even called Special Law 364 itself, and its application in the
Osorio proceedings, "Exhibit A evidencing the lack of independent
tribunals in Nicaragua."2 1 6
"The passage of Special Law 364 is itself further evidence of
undue political meddling in Nicaragua's judicial process.
The law asks judges to enforce a set of procedures that the
Nicaraguan Attorney General found were patently uncon-
stitutional and the Nicaraguan Supreme Court upheld only
because the defendants could choose to exempt themselves
from the law."217
Yet the trial judge, whom Judge Chaney in Mejia had found
was linked to fraud, denied defendants their right to opt out in
brazen disregard of these opinions.2 18
C. (No) Future for Nicaraguan DBCP Claims
The pernicious effects of Special Law 364 do not stop with the
individual plaintiffs in these two cases. The findings in both
Mejia and Osorio apply to all Nicaraguan DBCP claimants. Judge
Chaney specifically extended her findings from Mejia to Nicara-
gua in general:
Because of the pervasive nature of the fraud that perme-
ates the DBCP cases from Nicaragua, the Court questions
the authenticity and reliability of any documentary evi-
dence presented by plaintiffs that comes out of Nicaragua,
and it has serious doubts about the bona fides of any plain-
tiff claiming to have been injured as a result of exposure to
DBCP while employed on a Nicaraguan banana plantation
associated with Dole.219
These "serious doubts" were resolved in short order: in its appeal
of Tellez, the sister case to Mejia, Dole filed a Petition for Writ of
215. Id. at 1349.
216. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
217. Id.
218. See Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279 Although it affirmed the District Court's order,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to consider Judge Huck's finding that
Nicaragua lacks an impartial judiciary. Id.
219. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 8.
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Error Coram Vobis based upon the fraud evidence. The Court of
Appeal ordered plaintiffs to file a return to the superior court,
where, after six days of hearings, the writ was granted, the judg-
ments vacated, and the entire case dismissed with prejudice.22 0
As for the $2.1 billion in judgments awarded under Special
Law 364, and the claims now pending for billions more, they have
little chance of being enforced in the U.S. Not only is Judge
Huck's order citable as persuasive authority, but he also made a
finding on the $800 million sister case to Osorio, Herrera Rios: "In
effect, the Nicaraguan trial court admitted . . . Special Law 364
permits significant tort recoveries without any proof of causation,
and in many instances in direct contravention of unrefuted medi-
cal evidence."22 1
VII. IRONY, METONYMY, AND SPECIAL LAw 364
Recall that irony is dialectic, a reading of the various sub-per-
spectives in terms of one another. Reading the findings from
these two judgments in light of the commentary about DBCP liti-
gation and FNC, one attains a "perspective of perspectives" on
how the factors that shaped the development of Special Law 364
inevitably led to its unraveling as a mechanism to force litigation.
Nicaragua had tens of thousands of citizens claiming injury
from exposure to DBCP.222 For reasons ranging from a body of law
not designed to handle these types of claims, to an underfunded
and overburdened judiciary, its own legal system could not
redress these claims. 2 23 But the legal system of the United States
could. There was only one problem: none of those claims were
heard in the U.S. because her courts routinely dismissed them
under the FNC doctrine. 2 24 Rather than pursue other options like
settlement, which lacked the luster of seven-figure judgments,
union leaders and U.S. plaintiffs' attorneys pressured the Nicara-
guan legislature to enact a statute to attain those judgments.2 2 5
220. Statement of Decision at 2, Tellez v. Dole Food Company, Inc., No. BC312852
(L.A. Cnty. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2011). Shortly after entering judgment in Mejia,
Victoria G. Chaney was elevated to the Court of Appeal. Because of her experience in
Tellez and Mejia, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California appointed her
to preside over the writ proceedings.
221. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
222. See, e.g., Gonzalez & Loewenberg, supra note 112.
223. See discussion, supra Part IV.B.1.
224. Mayer & Sable, supra note 42, at 139.
225. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 72; see Hechler, supra note 97, at 90; see
Figueroa, supra note 1, at 158-59.
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That statute, Special Law 364, made defendants an offer they
could not refuse: accept U.S. jurisdiction, or face trial in Nicara-
gua under a process rigged against them.2 2 6 That statute, Special
Law 364, made defendants an offer they could not refuse: accept
U.S. jurisdiction, or face trial in Nicaragua under a process rigged
against them.22 7 The inherent flaw in Special Law 364 was that it
did nothing to account for what made Nicaragua an inadequate
forum in the first place: ill-equipped courts, untrained judges, and
rampant corruption.22 8 Once Nicaragua unleashed the monster, it
could not control the rampage.
The intent behind Special Law 364 was that claims filed in
Nicaragua would be dismissed and refiled in the U.S. 229 While
Special Law 364 laid out procedures for DBCP trials and permit-
ted all plaintiffs to claim indigent status, it did not fund the man-
date, provide more judges or court personnel, or offer judicial
training. Indeed, Special Law 364 fed the corruption that already
existed in Nicaragua.23 0 The opportunity for U.S.-sized judgments
provided an incentive for Nicaraguan lawyers, judges, union lead-
ers, and lab workers to profit from their investment in these cases
by bringing thousands of claims.23 1
Thus, the expectation of dismissal was thwarted when these
people did the one thing that would ensure them-as opposed to
U.S. attorneys-a piece of the action: keep the claims in Nicara-
gua. When the Osorio defendants chose not to pay the bond and
thereby accepted U.S. jurisdiction as provided under Special Law
364, Judge Torufio ruled that the plaintiffs "waived" defendants'
bond requirement and subjected them to a trial with accelerated
discovery, presumed causation, and large bond payments.23 2
Ignored was the fact that the Nicaraguan Supreme Court affirmed
the constitutionality of Special Law 364 by holding that it is the
226. See discussion supra Part V.C-D.
227. See discussion supra Sections IV(C) & (D).
228. See discussion supra Part IV.
229. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
230. See id. at 1349; see Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 73, 77-78; see generally
Figueroa, supra note 1, at 149; see generally Marlowe, supra note 73, at 303.
231. See Mejia Findings, supra note 5 1 72; see Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note
112, at 523-24 ("[T]he synergy of issues in these cases, involving facts that can be
difficult to verify, zealous advocates, frequently indigent plaintiffs susceptible to
undue influence, the potential for substantial damages, and foreign systems
particularly prone to manipulation, creates certain vulnerabilities to fraudulent
lawsuits and rule of law concerns.").
232. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
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opt-out provision that affords due process.23 3 Also overlooked was
that any judgment in Nicaragua had to be enforced where defend-
ants had assets: the United States. Any judgment arising from
these provisions-which after all were never meant to be
employed in Nicaragua-risked being unenforceable by violating
U.S. standards of due process.2 34
And this corruption, though planted in Nicaragua, branched
into the U.S. Like a case study on the necessity of the private
interest factors in the FNC analysis,23 5 the Los Angeles County
Superior Court had no power to compel witness testimony or enter
other orders that would have uprooted the fraud years earlier.23 6
When combined with the loss of employment records after the
Sandinista takeover and the leverage from having thousands of
plaintiffs, the hidden children, the fake lab reports, the falsified
work histories, and the coached testimony all made their way into
Mejia.23 7 After all, plaintiffs could not leave the rampant corrup-
tion of Nicaragua at home, given that their entire case was manu-
factured in a scheme made possible by Special Law 364.
VIII. EPILOGUE
Reading these judgments and related scholarship in terms of
two of Burke's master tropes provides multiple perspectives from
which to view Special Law 364. Applying metonymy, we see that
calls for justice were reduced to a mandate for U.S. court trials.
Applying irony, we see that attempts to force this mandate in dis-
regard of the signs of fraud or the requirements of due process
ensured that there can be no judgment from a trial on the merits.
Burke writes that "the four tropes shade into one another";23 8 thus,
the effects of irony are more pronounced in light of metonymy.
Dole had attempted to establish a settlement program with
injured workers if Nicaragua would have repealed Special Law
364, which inevitably became the very thing that denied plaintiffs
an opportunity for a monetary recovery.2 39
233. Consultation to the Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua
(Nicar. Oct. 16, 2003), translated in Saint Dahl, supra note 1, at 55.
234. See Heiser, supra note 1, at 660.
235. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
236. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, $$ 20, 133; see Woulfe, supra note 66, at 195.
237. Mejia Findings, supra note 5, 76.
238. BURKE, supra note 13, at 503.
239. Do, supra note 95, at 414.
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